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Executive Summary 
 
After Hezbollah fired thousands of rockets at northern Israel during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah 
War, the Israeli government began a crash program to find a technological solution to the rocket 
threat. The result was Iron Dome, which shot down its first rocket on April 7, 2011, and saw 
large-scale combat during wars in 2012 and 2014. The system has been hailed in Israel and 
worldwide as a success, with the Israeli military claiming a 90 percent interception rate. Some 
American defense commentators have even touted Iron Dome as evidence in favor of ballistic 
missile defense. However, serious questions remain about Iron Dome’s true technical efficacy, 
both in terms of its past performance and how it is likely to perform in the future under different 
conditions. Because so much about Iron Dome is classified, information provided by the Israeli 
military cannot be independently verified. Analyses performed by outside experts—both those 
questioning Iron Dome’s efficacy and those defending the Israeli government’s claims—are 
inconclusive.  
 
Assuming for the sake of argument that Iron Dome did, in fact, perform as advertised during its 
previous engagements, it is far from certain that it will be as successful in future engagements, 
where the volume of rocket fire will be higher and the rockets more accurate. This paper argues 
that Israel may have already reached “peak Iron Dome,” and the system’s military and political 
benefits will decrease in future wars until another technological breakthrough is made on rocket 
defense. This is not to say that Iron Dome was not worth the cost and should not have been 
procured. But expectations about Iron Dome from the Israeli military, Israeli civilians, and 
interested parties abroad should be tempered. If they are not, Iron Dome’s decreased success rate 
in future wars may pose political problems for Israel domestically and give Israel’s adversaries a 
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Introduction 
 
Ask any Israeli to name their country’s most important military innovation over the last decade 
and you are sure to hear the same answer over and over again: Iron Dome. In the eyes of many 
Israelis, Iron Dome is a uniquely Israeli accomplishment. After discovering how serious the 
rocket threat to Israel’s security was, the Israeli defense industry quickly developed a 
breakthrough weapon that captivated the world and has kept Israel largely safe from rocket 
attacks ever since.  
 
There is truth to this version of events, but as with all stories of national pride, the complete story 
is more complicated. Iron Dome has no doubt played an important role in Israel’s recent military 
conflicts with Hamas in the Gaza Strip, but its success against Hamas’s rockets is not without 
controversy, and its success in future wars is far from certain. This paper has three main goals: to 
provide an overview of Israel’s threat environment and the history that led to Iron Dome’s 
creation; to examine the debate about Iron Dome’s technical efficacy; and to speculate on Iron 
Dome’s future challenges and its role in Israeli defense policy.  
 
The paper will begin with a history of the missile and rocket threats that have faced the Middle 
East in general, and Israel in particular, over the past several decades. This context is important 
for understanding the decisions Israel has made with regard to rocket defense. Next, it will detail 
the defining event that forced Israel to crash-develop a rocket defense system, the 2006 Israel-
Hezbollah War, and Iron Dome’s rapid development. It will then examine Iron Dome’s 
performance in Israel’s two most recent conflicts with Hamas and explain why its performance 
has caused such controversy. The paper will end with an assessment of the problems Iron Dome 
is likely to face in future wars, regardless of Iron Dome’s true performance in past wars, and will 
propose that Israel has likely already hit “peak Iron Dome,” the height of the system’s ability to 
protect Israel and provide the Israeli government with political and military maneuvering room.    
 
 
Israel’s Security Environment, the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, and the Rationale for Iron 
Dome  
 
Israel’s Security Environment and the Missile Threat in Context  
Since its creation as a state in 1948, Israel has been at war with its Arab neighbors. This war has 
taken many shapes, from large-scale conventional wars to guerilla raids to terrorist attacks. The 
threat posed by ballistic missiles and rockets did not enter the minds of Israel’s military planners 
until decades after the state was founded given the multitude of other, more pressing threats. As a 
small state without the resources, population, or economic strength to fight long wars or wars of 
attrition, Israeli military doctrine has always rested on three main pillars: deterrence, early 
warning, and rapid battlefield decision.1  
 
By developing an extremely well-trained and competent reservist-based fighting force, Israel 
hopes to dissuade its enemies from initiating large-scale war in the first place. By retaliating 
swiftly and strongly to even small provocations, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) make wars of 
attrition, which it cannot win, too costly for its enemies to consider. If a large-scale war that 
threatened Israel’s existence were to take place, Israel relies on its intelligence services to 
 
Future Challenges for Israel’s Iron Dome Rocket Defenses     4 
provide enough warning time for the reserves to be called up—Israel’s standing army is far too 
small to fight a major war without the reserves that comprise the majority of the IDF. Once such 
a war begins, Israel must bring about an end to the war on favorable terms as quickly as possible. 
This had led to an ethos of offensive maneuver meant to move the battle to enemy territory and 
achieve battlefield decision as quickly as possible.2 For most of the country’s history, defense 
was noticeably absent from the nation’s defense doctrine. A small country like Israel simply did 
not have the means to invest in defensive assets which in any case would have led to a strategy 
that placed Israel at a structural disadvantage vis-à-vis its adversaries.  
 
The first use of ballistic missiles in the region was during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, when 
Egypt fired three Scud missiles at Israeli military positions just before a ceasefire went into 
effect.3 During this war, Syria also fired several Frog-7 heavy artillery rockets into northern 
Israel. In accordance with its defense doctrine, Israel responded to the Frog-7 attacks by sending 
its air force to retaliate against high-value targets in Syria. The retaliation was successful and 
intra-war deterrence was achieved; Syria did not fire Frog-7 rockets at Israel again.4 This 
validated Israel’s belief that no defense against such missiles and rockets was needed beyond a 
strong retaliatory capability.  
 
The use of ballistic missiles during the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted from 1980 to 1988, was much 
more consequential. Both Iraq and Iran fired ballistic missiles at each other’s cities, sowing fear 
and causing panic, especially on the Iranian side.5 Towards the end of the war in 1988, in the 
finale of the “war of the cities,” Iraq fired close to 200 ballistic missiles at Iran, killing some 
2,000 people.6 These devastating strikes contributed to Iran’s decision to accept a ceasefire, 
demonstrating the political utility of ballistic missiles when employed against civilian targets.  
 
It was during this time that Israel began reconsidering its purely offense-based retaliatory 
strategy for deterring the use of ballistic missiles, though not just because ballistic missiles began 
entering the arsenals of Arab armies in larger numbers or because their utility as both a military 
and political weapon was demonstrated during the Iran-Iraq War. U.S. President Ronald Reagan, 
in office for much of the 1980s, was a staunch advocate of ballistic missile defense (BMD), and 
some in Israel saw Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), dubbed “Star Wars” by its 
critics, as an opportunity to deepen cooperation with the United States.7 The decision to 
cooperate with the United States on SDI was controversial in Israel because of the program’s 
defensive nature. Why should Israel spend its limited resources on a project of dubious value 
when deterrence through the threat of retaliation would suffice? But because of the opportunity 
to deepen cooperation with the United States, and because of the growing ballistic missile 
threat,8 Israel signed on to SDI and began its journey to becoming a world leader in missile 
defense.  
 
The experience of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 strengthened the position of missile defense 
advocates in Israel. In an effort to goad Israel into attacking Iraq and thus splinter the U.S.-led 
coalition formed to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, Iraq fired 31 Scud missiles at Israeli 
cities. In order to convince Israel not to retaliate, the United States deployed Patriot PAC-2 
missile defense batteries to Israel and committed the U.S. Air Force to destroying the Scud 
launchers. These measures were unsuccessful. The Patriot batteries were shown to be almost 
completely ineffective at stopping the incoming Scuds, and the Scud launchers were too difficult 
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for the U.S. Air Force to find and destroy.9 After the Persian Gulf War, Israel became fully 
committed to BMD and developed its Arrow missile defense system, designed to intercept 
ballistic missiles during the midcourse phase of their flight.  
 
While Israel was focusing on the threat posed by ballistic missiles in the hands of enemies such 
as Saddam Hussein and the Iranian Ayatollahs, another related threat to Israel’s security was 
forming along its borders that received scant attention. In an effort to push the Palestine 
Liberation Organization away from Israel’s border with Lebanon, Israel launched a massive 
incursion into Lebanon called Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982. After the invasion, the IDF 
maintained an occupation of southern Lebanon as a security zone until the year 2000.10 In 
response, a Shia militia called Hezbollah arose (with Iran’s help) to force the Israelis out of the 
security zone.  
 
Hezbollah used classic guerilla and terrorist tactics against the Israeli presence in southern 
Lebanon, with varying degrees of success, but it realized that if it was to have any strategic 
success against Israel, it would need a way to deter Israel’s military superiority, or bypass it to 
put pressure on the Israeli public directly. Perhaps drawing lessons from Saddam Hussein’s 
success with ballistic missiles against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War and against Israel during the 
Persian Gulf War, Hezbollah found its deterrent in the form of short-range rockets. Calculating 
that Israel had no defense against these weapons and that Israel’s superior offense capabilities 
would be unable to target all of Hezbollah’s launchers with stand-off weapons (just as the United 
States was unable to hunt down Saddam Hussein’s Scud launchers in 1991), Hezbollah prepared 
for a war of attrition that would utilize these rockets in a strategic, not just a tactical, manner.  
 
Most of Hezbollah’s rockets are of the Katyusha family—various types and models of the Soviet 
World War II-era artillery rockets that are cheap and ubiquitous to this day.11 Though they are 
inaccurate and have a range of only 20-25 km, when fired as a “statistical weapon,” that is, in 
large volleys, a certain percentage of the rockets will hit valuable targets, and the others will sow 
fear and panic. Katyushas, mortars, and other artillery had been fired into Israel from Lebanon 
before, mostly by Palestinian militants, but they had never been used strategically until 
Hezbollah began developing a strategy to use them in this way in 1992. After Israel assassinated 
Hezbollah leader Abbas Musawi in early 1992, Hezbollah’s new leader, Hassan Nasrallah, fired 
Katyushas into northern Israel in retaliation, marking the first use of these weapons by 
Hezbollah.12 No longer would Israel have free reign in Lebanon—Hezbollah now had the 
capability to influence Israeli policy inside the security zone by being able to strike outside of it. 
This marked the beginning of a new dynamic that would become increasingly apparent over the 
next decade.    
 
In 1993, in response to an increase in Hezbollah attacks against Israeli forces in the security 
zone, Israel launched Operation Accountability. Hezbollah had prepared its fighters for face-to-
face combat with the Israelis; instead, Israel used its overwhelming conventional and 
technological superiority to launch stand-off attacks that devastated Hezbollah positions without 
the need for close quarter fighting.13 This drove Hezbollah to rely further on its Katyusha 
strategy, which reduced the utility of Israel’s conventional superiority and played to Hezbollah’s 
greater willingness to engage in attrition-based warfare.  
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The next major round of fighting came in 1996. After Hezbollah launched a barrage of rockets 
into northern Israel, wounding 38 people, Israel responded with Operation Grapes of Wrath. 
Israel stuck to employing the stand-off strategy that it had used three years earlier; Hezbollah, 
however, did not wait to confront Israeli soldiers face-to-face but instead fired hundreds of 
Katyusha rockets at Israel, disrupting life for thousands of Israelis.14 Hezbollah was able to 
continue the rocket fire throughout the fighting and the IDF was unable to stop it.15 After 
Operation Grapes of Wrath, Hezbollah drew the correct conclusions and realized the power of 
large quantities of these low-quality weapons that could terrorize the Israeli homeland—a 
capability against which the IDF’s conventional superiority was powerless. Israel also realized 
its inability to address this threat, and began a development project with the United States to find 
a solution. That solution was the Nautilus, or the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL).  
 
Just like BMD before it, THEL was controversial in Israel. Many experts criticized its cost and 
its performance.16 It was a bulky system, taking up the size of six city buses, and was prone to 
leaking the chemicals used to create the laser interceptor.17 Such a system would be a sitting 
duck prone to counter-fire, and dozens of systems would be needed to defend northern Israel, 
which would be prohibitively expensive.18 After successful trials in New Mexico, the system was 
scrapped in 2005 and judged unsuitable for actual battlefield conditions.19 Instead of quickly 
coming up with an alternative to THEL—either another defensive system or an alternative war 
doctrine to deal with the rocket threat posed by Hezbollah—Israel went back to ignoring the 
problem and reverted to the same stand-off strategy that had failed it in Operation Grapes of 
Wrath. That decision would quickly come back to haunt Israel.  
 
Wake Up Call: The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War and the Need for Rocket Defense 
Israel withdrew its forces from southern Lebanon in 2000 with a promise to the Israeli public to 
respond to any Hezbollah attacks from the border. For a myriad of political and operational 
reasons, those responses never materialized. Of greater importance than the occasional 
provocation was Hezbollah’s impressive preparation for war with Israel, one that would double 
down on the rocket strategy that served it so well in the past. Hezbollah established rocket-firing 
units along the border in villages and in open areas supported by vast tunnel networks for 
transporting weapons and manning defensive positions.20  
 
By 2006, Hezbollah had amassed a stockpile of 12,000 to 13,000 rockets and missiles supplied 
mostly by Iran and Syria, most of them 122mm Katyushas.21 Other rockets and missiles included 
220mm and 302mm rockets, as well as Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets supplied by Iran.22 Knowing 
that Israel’s stand-off firepower would not be able to destroy all of these rockets or their 
launchers in a politically acceptable amount of time, Hezbollah prepared to be able to fire rockets 
into Israel for the duration of any conflict. With such a large arsenal of rockets, even if many 
were destroyed by Israeli airpower before they could be used, enough would survive for a long 
campaign of attrition—exactly the type of conflict the Israelis were unwilling and unable to 
fight. 
 
On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah launched an operation along the border with Israel that saw two 
Israeli soldiers kidnapped and eight killed. Israel’s new and inexperienced leadership saw an 
opportunity to severely weaken Hezbollah and score popularity with the Israeli public for 
avenging Hezbollah’s hostility and bringing the two captive soldiers home. However, the IDF 
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was unprepared for a confrontation with Hezbollah and was even more unprepared to deal with 
the use of rockets in a strategic manner. The war dragged on for 34 days and saw 4,228 rockets 
fired into Israel, the largest sustained shelling of a geographical area since the Iran-Iraq War.23 
On average, 100 rockets were fired per day, though towards the end of the war it became closer 
to 200, demonstrating Hezbollah’s ability to control the tempo of its operations even under 
massive aerial assault.  
 
Roughly one-fourth of the rockets fired landed in populated areas, while the rest landed in open 
spaces and caused no damage other than fires. In addition to disrupting normal life for hundreds 
of thousands of people in northern Israel, 53 Israelis were killed, over 2,000 were wounded, and 
there was extensive damage to homes and infrastructure.24 The IDF’s inability to stop the 
rockets, along with the IDF’s other strategic and tactical failures during the war, enabled 
Hezbollah to claim victory as the first Arab fighting force able to fight Israel to a draw on the 
battlefield.25  
 
Because of Israel’s small size and because of the massive quantity of Katyusha rockets fired, 
these tactical weapons were used to strategic effect by Hezbollah. It became clear that the IDF’s 
conventional superiority would not be able to effectively hunt down and destroy all of the 
Katyusha launchers or the stockpiles of rockets themselves, and in future wars Israel would be 
vulnerable to the same threat of massive shelling. The Israeli public saw the war and the 
unrelenting rocket fire from Lebanon as a massive failure. It was clear that a solution needed to 
be found to protect Israeli civilians from rocket fire, both during times of relative calm and 
during times of intense fighting. In the debate about the role of defense in Israel’s military 
strategy, those promoting defense—with missile and rocket defense front-and-center—had 
finally won.  
 
 
Iron Dome’s Development and Specs 
 
The Israeli Ministry of Defense (IMOD) awarded Israeli defense contractor Rafael the contract 
to develop a rocket defense system in February 2007.26 Rafael, however, would not have to start 
from scratch. Despite the United States and Israel abandoning THEL in 2005 and the IDF 
focusing on its stand-off firepower strategy, the head of the IMOD’s R&D division, Danny Gold, 
was looking into anti-rocket technology without the approval of his bosses starting in 2005.27 
 
Believing Israel had the technical know-how and ingenuity to address the rocket threat, Gold 
began work on what would become Iron Dome before the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War even 
started. After Rafael was awarded the contract, the IMOD and Rafael engineers worked around 
the clock, even receiving a special exception from Israel’s Rabbinate to work on the Sabbath.28 
Full-scale development began at the end of 2007, just months after the contract was awarded.29 
After three and a half years of development, Iron Dome became operational, and on April 7, 
2011, it shot down its first rocket, a Grad artillery rocket fired from the Gaza Strip by Hamas.30  
 
Information about Iron Dome’s specifications is difficult to confirm, but Jane’s Information 
Group has some data publically available. These technical specifications are only estimates, and 
other publications have produced estimates that slightly differ. According to Jane’s, Iron Dome 
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is an all-weather counter rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) system capable of detecting and 
intercepting incoming projectiles within ranges of 4km to 70km.31 Each battery of the system is 
comprised of three components: a radar for detecting and tracking incoming threats; a battle 
management and fire-control center; and three missile launching units, each carrying 20 Tamir 
interceptors.32  
 
Iron Dome’s radar, an EL/M-2084 S-band radar, is an Active Electronically Scanned Array 
multirole radar that locates the launch origin of incoming rockets and mortars, tracks the 
projectiles in flight, calculates an intercept solution, and directs the interceptor to the interception 
point.33 The target acquisition process is reportedly performed in anywhere from less than one 
second to seven seconds, with the interceptor launch taking place just one second after that.34 It 
can locate the source of artillery and rocket fire with a circular error probable (CEP) of 490ft 
(150m) at 31mi (50km), according to Military Periscope, an online weapons database.35 Each 
battery is estimated to be able to protect a 58mi2/150km2 area.36 
 
Using the information gathered by the radar, soldiers at the battle management and fire-control 
center determine if the rocket is on a trajectory to hit a populated area (or areas of strategic 
importance such as industrial sites or military bases that the state would want to defend). If the 
rocket is on target to land in an open field or the desert, no further action is taken—the rocket is 
ignored and left to explode in the open where it will not cause any damage. If the rocket is on 
target to land in a populated or important area, the battle management and fire-control center will 
take appropriate action. The details on how automated this process is, and exactly how decisions 
to intercept are made, are not publically available, but it does appear that the system has a “man 
in the loop” who performs some level of decision making about whether to intercept an incoming 
rocket or not.37 According to one report in Aviation Week, Iron Dome is capable of operating 
fully automatically, but the Israeli Air Force chooses to have soldiers confirm each intercept.38  
 
If the decision is made to intercept, a Tamir interceptor is fired from one of the launching units 
and sent up into the sky to meet the incoming threat. According to Jane’s, the Tamir interceptor 
is a 90kg solid-fuel missile with a length of 3m and a diameter of 160mm. It has a minimum 
range of 2km and a maximum range of 40km39 with a top speed of Mach 2.2 (700m/sec).40 
Specifics about the warhead are unavailable, but it is reported to be a proximity fuse 
fragmentation warhead that communicates with the radar to receive guidance information via 
uplink communication.41  
 
After being guided to the general location of the intercept point, the Tamir’s on-board radar 
seeker takes over and maneuvers closer to the target. Once it is close enough, it detonates and 
sprays rods into the target warhead (attempting to do so at the highest possible altitude to reduce 
the concentration of any chemical or biological agents that the incoming missile might be 
carrying). The Israeli government has never confirmed how many Tamir interceptors it fires at 
each incoming rocket. Reports indicate that early on, Iron Dome would fire two interceptors for 
each incoming rocket on track to hit a defended area, but as the system has improved and 
received upgrades, it now fires only one. An exception to this policy may exist for rockets fired 
at Tel Aviv, where, according to videos capturing the interceptions, two rockets are fired to 
increase the probability of a successful intercept.42 
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The discrimination process—assessing which rockets pose a threat and ignoring the ones that do 
not—is essential both for cost control and the viability of the rocket defense concept. Iron Dome 
batteries and Tamir interceptors are not cheap, especially when compared to the cost of the 
rockets and mortars they are engaging. Exact figures are not available, but best estimates put the 
cost of each Iron Dome battery at about $50 million, including the radar and the battle 
management center. Estimates for the cost of a single Tamir interceptor range from $20,000 to 
$100,000,43 with most estimates claiming around $50,000. Meanwhile, Qassam and Katyusha 
rockets range from hundreds of dollars to the single thousands of dollars. Such a cost-exchange 
ratio would be prohibitively expensive if Iron Dome were required to expend $50,000 each time 
a $500 rocket were fired at Israel.  
 
Given the volume of rocket fire targeting Israel, the IDF would run out of interceptors if it had to 
engage all incoming rockets as opposed the smaller percentage of rockets whose trajectories 
indicate they will land in the protected envelope. Providing coverage for the entire country is 
also a costly endeavor. According to most estimates, Israel has nine Iron Dome batteries, and 
Israeli officials estimate it would take 13 batteries to cover the entire country, which they plan to 
do.44 While Israel developed Iron Dome on its own, the United States provided Israel with 
monetary assistance to the tune of around $1 billion between FY2011-FY2016 for production 
and procurement, greatly offsetting the cost that Israel’s much smaller defense budget would 
have to allocate.45  
 
It is unclear what Israeli officials mean when they talk of providing coverage to the entirety of 
Israel’s territory. Do they mean providing radar coverage and the ability to intercept a rocket 
anywhere in the country, or do they mean the ability to intercept a high volume of rocket fire on 
multiple parts of the country simultaneously? The answer to this question, among others, will 
have serious policy consequences for Israel, and will be discussed later in the paper.  
 
 
Iron Dome’s Performance: Competing Claims about Technical Efficacy  
 
After Iron Dome’s debut on April 7, 2011, it was put to the test in two major military conflicts 
between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Israel’s Operation Pillar of Defense, a week-long 
mini-war between Israel and Hamas, took place from November 14 to November 21 in 2012. 
Another much longer and bloodier war followed two years later, called Operation Protective 
Edge by Israel. From July 8 to August 26, 2014, Hamas and other Islamist groups in Gaza 
launched thousands of rockets into Israel while the IDF conducted thousands of airstrikes in 
Gaza along with limited ground incursions. Iron Dome was the darling of both operations, both 
in Israel and around the world. Commentators touted the success of the system, often using 
phrases like “game changer” and “stunningly effective.” In Israel, Iron Dome became something 
of a cultural icon, inspiring songs, skits, and even tattoos.46 But in the midst of the outcry of 
support and pride for Iron Dome, a few skeptics emerged. Their analyses have cast doubt over 
the conventional wisdom about Iron Dome and led to a debate among experts as to whether Iron 
Dome’s performance is actually what the Israeli government claims.  
 
This section of the paper will look at the competing claims about Iron Dome’s technical efficacy 
in both conflicts and attempt to assess the validity of each side’s argument as best as possible 
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with the limited information available. Two realities make such an analysis difficult: the fact that 
most of the data about Iron Dome is provided by the Israeli government and cannot be 
independently verified, and the fact that a great deal of information about Iron Dome remains 
classified. Given these constraints, the conclusions derived from this examination will not be 
definitive. The concluding section of the paper that assesses the proper role of rocket defense in 
Israel’s defense strategy will take into account the wide array of possibilities about Iron Dome’s 
true technical capabilities.  
 
Operation Pillar of Defense: November 14 – 21, 2012 
Over the eight days of this mini-war, Hamas and other Islamist groups in Gaza fired “more than 
1,506 rockets” into Israel, according to the IDF.47 Other estimates vary, and Hamas claims a 
slightly higher number, but all estimates hover around 1,500. The IDF claims that it intercepted 
421 rockets successfully, achieving an 84 percent interception success rate.48 Working 
backwards, this means that of the 1,506 rockets fired into Israel, 501 rockets were on track to 
strike populated areas (421 / .84 ≈ 501). According to some sources, the IDF claims that the 
number of rockets that would have hit defended areas was 480,49 which is slightly different from 
the 501 number derived from using the 421 and 84 percent numbers also taken from the IDF. 
This discrepancy is not explained anywhere in the open literature.  
 
Assuming the 421 and 501 estimates are correct, that means that there were 80 rockets that Iron 
Dome attempted to intercept but failed to do so, meaning these 80 rockets must have landed 
within areas defended by Iron Dome. Some reports cite the IDF as claiming that the number of 
failed interceptions was 58, which is a difference of 22 rockets from the 80 estimate.50 A police 
report from the southern district of the Israel Police says that 109 rockets fell in built-up areas, 
which is somewhat close to the 80 rocket estimate but almost double the 58 rocket estimate 
claimed by the IDF.51  
 
Needless to say, the lack of definitive data about the number of rockets fired, the number of 
rockets on track to hit defended areas, the number of rockets Iron Dome attempted to intercept, 
and the number of rockets Iron Dome successfully intercepted introduces skepticism about the 
IDF’s claims. It may be that the IDF has this data but is not releasing it or allowing others to 
independently verify it; it might also be that during the chaos of war the data collection process 
was imperfect and exact numbers simply aren’t available. Over the course of the war, five Israeli 
civilians and one soldier were killed by rocket fire.52 Operating the system during the war cost 
between $25 million and $30 million, including the cost of the expended Tamirs.53 
 
Operation Protective Edge: July 8 – August 26, 2014 
The data for Operation Protective Edge has even more variance than the data for Pillar of 
Defense. According to an Israeli defense expert who received an oral briefing by an IDF 
spokesman (and asked to remain anonymous in this paper), 4,591 rockets and mortars were fired 
at Israel during the 50-day war.54 One hundred and ninety-seven of those exploded or landed in 
Gaza, leaving 4,394 that actually landed in Israel. Of those, 3,434 landed in “open spaces,” areas 
not in Iron Dome’s envelope. That means that 960 rockets were judged by Iron Dome to pose a 
threat to defended areas.  
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Of these 960 threatening rockets, Iron Dome successfully intercepted 735, leaving 225 that hit 
within the protective envelope. Of those 225, Iron Dome engaged 70 but the engagements were 
unsuccessful, according to a report from Aviation Week.55 No explanation is given for why Iron 
Dome did not attempt to intercept the remaining 155 rockets that hit within the defended 
envelope, though it may be possible that some of these were actually mortars with ranges of 
under 4km, which Iron Dome is not designed to defend against. Other estimates for the total 
number of rockets fired vary slightly, while other estimates for the number of rockets that landed 
in open areas vary by a few hundred. The main explanation for this wide variance is that some 
estimates include mortar attacks while others only include rocket attacks.56 Discrepancies could 
conceivably also occur from accounting that relies on daily reporting by Israeli news outlets 
during the war, which may report inaccurate or incomplete information under stressful wartime 
conditions.  
 
The percentage success rate during this war touted by the IDF and reported by the media 
worldwide is 90 percent, presumably derived from the 735 successful intercepts plus the 70 
unsuccessful intercepts (735 + 70 = 805; 735 / 805 = .913 ≈ 90 percent). However, if one takes 
into account that 225 rockets reportedly landed within the protective envelope, a more honest 
percentage success rate would be 76 percent (735 / 960 = .7656  ≈ 76 percent), the number of 
interceptions divided by the number of rockets that actually hit built-up areas, regardless of 
whether Iron Dome attempted to intercept them or not. Over the course of the 50-day war, 
rockets killed two people, one civilian and one soldier.57   
 
The IDF’s claims about Iron Dome’s performance are impressive (see Table 1 on page 10 for a 
summary of these claims). Over the course of these wars, the Israeli population and the Israeli 
government both developed expectations about what Iron Dome is supposed to provide. While 
Iron Dome was still in the developmental stage, it was not clear what the exact objective of the 
system would be—was it to save as many Israeli lives as possible, provide protection to IDF 
bases, or provide decision makers with more options? After being seen as such a success in 
Israel, the expectations for Iron Dome can be summarized as follows. The Israeli public expects 
Iron Dome to protect as many lives as possible and limit damage to property.58 All population 
centers in Israel now expect to be covered if they are within rocket range. Israelis see Iron Dome 
as part of the state’s moral obligation to do everything within its power to protect its citizens.  
 
The Israeli government sees Iron Dome as an instrument of political and military flexibility. 
Because Iron Dome gives the Israeli population a sense of security and shows the public that the 
government is “doing something” to protect them, there is less public pressure on the 
government for military action. This gives the Israeli government more political maneuvering 
room and enables decisions about the use of force to be made with less political considerations.59 
According to many Israeli officials and commentators, if it weren’t for Iron Dome, Israel would 
have been forced to invade Gaza to stop the rockets or the government would have paid a 
political price. Since the cost of a single day of IDF ground operations in Gaza is estimated to 
cost around $260 million,60 and the cost in Palestinian civilian lives and the lives of Israeli 
soldiers would be catastrophic, anything that gives the Israeli government more options short of 
invading Gaza is beneficial.  
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These expectations have produced tangible benefits for Israel while also setting the stage for 
potential drawbacks in the future (to be addressed in later in the paper). In addition to saving 
lives and providing decision makers with greater flexibility, Iron Dome was a massive 
propaganda victory for Israel and helped Israelis view the 2012 and 2014 wars as successes even 
though Hamas was not defeated and the rocket fire continued throughout both operations. Israeli 
researchers even found that confidence in Iron Dome helped reduce Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder among those affected by Operation Protective Edge.61     
    
 Pillar of Defense Protective Edge 
Rockets/Mortars Fired 1,506 4,591 
Rockets Intercepted 421 735 
% Success Rate 84% 90% 
Deaths 6 2 
Injuries 240 N/A 
Cost $30 million N/A 
Table 1: IDF Claims about Iron Dome’s Success Rate in 2012 and 201462 
The benefits that are derived from the IDF’s claims about Iron Dome are real, but they do not 
change the fact that the information provided about the system’s actual performance has not been 
verified by independent parties. There is still much important information that the IDF has not 
produced, which deprives these figures of the context necessary to fully assess Iron Dome’s 
performance. Helpful additional information would include: how many interceptors were fired at 
each incoming threatening rocket; when were batteries undergoing reloading or maintenance, 
and does this account for some of the threatening rockets that Iron Dome did not engage; were 
there technological glitches or instances of human error; and where did each rocket land?63 
Having answers to these questions would help provide a more complete picture and make an 
assessment of Iron Dome’s technical efficacy much easier to perform. In the absence of such 
information, the IDF’s claims must be met with a healthy degree of skepticism.   
 
Iron Dome a Hoax?  
That skepticism did not take long to materialize. Just months after Operation Pillar of Defense, 
Theodore Postol, a missile expert and professor of Science, Technology, and National Security 
Policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, wrote that Iron Dome could not have 
performed as well as the Israeli government claimed. Postol’s analysis immediately gained 
attention among academics in the United States due to his past success in exposing the failure of 
the Patriot PAC-2 batteries during the Persian Gulf War. A handful of other skeptics also 
emerged, but since Postol’s analysis is the most well-known and comprehensive, this paper will 
focus on evaluating his claims.  
 
Postol analyzed footage of Iron Dome interceptions, mostly videos uploaded to the internet by 
Israelis who captured the event on their cellphones, and concluded that Iron Dome’s Tamir 
interceptors were not engaging the target rockets in a way that would lead to a high success 
rate.64 In fact, Postol estimates that Iron Dome’s true interception rate is closer to 5 percent. In 
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order to understand how Postol came to this conclusion, it is important to understand the basic 
physics of rocket defense.  
 
The objective of rocket defense is to explode or otherwise disable the warhead of the incoming 
projectile. This must be done either by slamming an interceptor’s kill vehicle into the warhead of 
the incoming projectile (known as a hit-to-kill interception, likened to “hitting a bullet with a 
bullet”), or by exploding an interceptor’s warhead near the incoming projectile and spraying it 
with shrapnel that explodes or disables it (known as a fragmentation or explosive detonation 
interception). For fragmentation interceptions, which is the method Iron Dome reportedly uses, 
engagements between the interceptor and the incoming rocket need to be head-on, or 
antiparallel.65 If the interceptor approaches the target projectile from the side or from behind, it 
will explode and spray its shrapnel into the rocket motor, not the warhead at the tip of the 
descending rocket. During the descent phase of a ballistic projectile, the rocket motor will have 
already expended its fuel, meaning it is essentially an empty tube.66 Because the descending 
front-end of the rocket is the heavy end, blowing holes in the empty motor tube most likely will 
not cause the rocket to tumble or otherwise alter its stable trajectory. The only way to explode 
the interceptor warhead in a way that will send shrapnel into the target warhead is by 
approaching the target warhead head-on (see section A of Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Possible Interceptor Confrontation Angles67 
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This confrontation angle allows the Tamir’s radar seeker to detect the incoming projectile, 
estimate where the front of the projectile is, and calculate how long it will take the front of the 
projectile to line up with the Tamir’s warhead (located behind the radar seeker).68 Approaching 
the target projectile from behind will cause the radar seeker to think the end of the target 
projectile is in fact the front of it (see section B of Figure 1). Side engagements are also 
extremely unlikely to line up such that the shrapnel from the interceptor hits the warhead of the 
incoming rocket.  
 
By looking at dozens of Iron Dome interception videos, Postol concluded that fewer than 20 
percent of the engagements were antiparallel. He determined this by looking at the contrails of 
the interceptors as they approached their targets and by looking for asymmetric explosions as a 
sign that the target warhead had actually detonated. According to his analysis of the footage from 
both Pillar of Defense and Protective Edge, the Tamirs appear to be maneuvering wildly and 
chasing the rocket instead of meeting it head-on as it descends on a steep trajectory. 
Maneuvering at the end of the engagement to chase the rocket indicates the interception is not 
antiparallel. Richard Lloyd, a former Raytheon employee and consultant for Tesla Laboratories, 
agrees that the contrails show the Tamirs engaging in maneuvers that indicate interceptions from 
the side.69 Postol also saw no evidence of asymmetrical explosions. If only the interceptor 
warhead detonates, a spherical explosion would be seen; however, if the interceptor successfully 
causes the target warhead to detonate, an asymmetric fireball should be seen as both warheads 
explode next to each other.  
 
The Defenders Respond 
Defenders of Iron Dome take issue with the analysis and claims of Postol and the other skeptics. 
The response to Postol’s analysis consists broadly of three arguments. First, Iron Dome’s 
defenders take issue with relying on video footage uploaded to YouTube for a technical analysis 
of a complex rocket defense system. Hundreds of rocket interceptions occurred, so a random 
sample of just a few dozen engagements, some of which may be repeat videos of the same 
engagement shot from different angles, does not meet the threshold of a proper scientific 
analysis. Uzi Rubin, one of Iron Dome’s fiercest defenders and the former head of Israel’s 
missile defense agency, also points out that the videos are often of poor and grainy quality, 
making it difficult to assess what’s happening in the video.70 Additionally, Rubin and others say 
that relying on 2-dimentional footage of a 3-dimentional event without knowing the angle that 
the footage was shot from makes such videos an unreliable method for evaluating Iron Dome.71  
 
The second piece of evidence that Iron Dome’s defenders point to is the reduction in Israeli  
casualties from the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War versus the two wars in Gaza. In 2006, 4,228 
rockets were fired into Israel, killing 53 Israelis. This means that it took on average 79 rockets to 
kill one person. In Pillar of Defense, 1,506 rockets were fired and six Israelis were killed, 
producing a rocket-to-fatality ratio of 251:1 (Rubin’s ratio is different because he counts 1,600 
rockets fired and five deaths). With Protective Edge, producing such a ratio becomes more 
difficult because both rockets and mortars are counted. Rubin assumes roughly 3,000 of the 
4,591 projectiles fired were rockets. He also counts only two deaths inside Israel, producing a 
ratio of 1,500:1. As the number of rockets required to kill a single person increases with each 
war, and increases substantially from 2006 to 2012, Rubin concludes that Iron Dome must be 
working as advertised.72  
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The third argument advanced by Iron Dome’s defenders pertains to damage claims filed by 
Israelis to receive compensation for destruction caused to their property by aggression from 
Israel’s enemies.73 This state-run insurance program is funded from tax revenue on property 
transactions.74 Israelis are eligible for compensation even for extremely minor damages, such as 
scratched paint on a car. A summary of the insurance claims is reproduced from Rubin’s 
February 2015 paper about Iron Dome in Table 2, with the exact “rockets fired” totals used 
instead of Rubin’s rounded figures. 
 
War Rockets Fired Damage Claims Filed Ratio Claims/Rockets 
2006 Lebanon 4,228 26,653 6.3 
2012 Gaza 1,506 3,921 2.6 
2014 Gaza 4,591 4,525 0.98 
Table 2: Number of Damage Claims and Claims per Rocket75 
As the ratio of damage claims per rocket fired decreases with each war, Rubin concludes that 
Iron Dome must be intercepting the incoming rockets effectively. He also cites the actual 
monetary compensation paid by the Israeli government to citizens who filed claims. According 
to Rubin’s figures, the dollar amount per rocket was $29,500 in 2006; $9,000 per rocket in 2012; 
and $5,100 per rocket in 2014.76 This decrease in insurance money paid out per rocket is 
presented as further evidence that fewer missiles were hitting Israel. The still large number of 
damage claims filed is due to rocket and Tamir interceptor fragments that fall to the ground after 
a successful intercept and cause light damage to cars and windows. 
 
Assessing the Arguments of Iron Dome’s Detractors and Defenders 
Missile defense experts broadly agree with Postol’s assessment that the interceptor must engage 
the incoming rocket head-on, but the criticism of his method of evaluation is valid. The 
interceptions that Postol analyzes do not qualify as a random sample of interceptions—there 
could be a selection bias in terms of which interceptions were captured on film. There is also no 
way to confirm that multiple videos are not showing the same interception from different angles. 
The fact that the videos are low-quality and that the distances and viewing angles are unknown 
also weaken Postol’s case. It is also possible that Iron Dome is meant to perform in a way that 
Postol and others have not considered. Iron Dome’s design is classified so Postol and others are 
left to speculate about how the specifics of the system work. Bill Sweetman, an editor and 
aerospace journalist at Aviation Week, posits that it is possible Iron Dome is in fact designed to 
perform the observed endgame maneuvers and is destroying the warheads of the incoming 
rockets via some new method.77 However, this too is unprovable. Therefore, while Postol raises 
valid doubts about Iron Dome—and indeed, many of the videos in question do appear to show 
contrails that indicate wild maneuvers—his analysis is inconclusive. 
 
That being said, the evidence put forward by Iron Dome’s defenders fails to disprove Postol’s 
arguments, and even raises new suspicions. The arguments about reduced fatalities and property 
damage are particularly flawed. There are two other variables that can also explain the difference 
in fatalities and property damage between the 2006 war against Hezbollah and the two wars 
against Hamas in 2012 and 2014.  
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The first is the difference in population density between northern and southern Israel. Appendix 
A shows Israel’s population density in the year 2014. As the map makes clear, there are many 
more localities in northern Israel than there are in southern Israel, and the population density is 
higher in northern Israel. According to estimates using data from Israel’s Central Bureau of 
Statistics, the combined population of Israel’s Northern District and Israel’s Haifa District (both 
targeted by Hezbollah rockets in 2006) was 2,361,700 people in 2015.78 Israel’s Southern 
District, which bore the brunt of Hamas’s rocket attacks in 2012 and 2014, had an estimated 
population of 1,217,500 for the year 2015. Thus, Israel’s Northern and Haifa Districts have over 
a million more people than the Southern District, which could help explain the higher casualty 
rate in 2006. A more detailed analysis of the effect of population density on rocket fatalities and 
property damage must be performed in order to rule it out as a variable that contributed to the 
difference in casualty rates between 2006 and 2012/2014. 
 
Another plausible, even likely, explanation for the low fatality figures in Pillar of Defense and 
Protective Edge is increased civil defense. Israel maintains a system of public shelters and most 
Israelis have fortified “safe rooms” in their homes that protect against rockets and bombs. 
Israelis are alerted to seek shelter by a sophisticated constellation of radars and electro-optic 
sensors that detect launches and trigger air raid sirens in the areas where the rocket might land.79 
For people close to the Gaza border, that warning time can be as little as 15 seconds.80 After the 
high casualty figures seen in 2006, and the low-frequency but constant rocket fire from Gaza 
over the past decade, it is a safe assumption that Israelis have become accustomed to quickly 
seeking shelter when the air raid siren sounds. The IDF is constantly working to improve its 
ability to give longer warning times, enabling more people to get to safety. There are even a 
number of smartphone apps, including one from the IDF, that alert people via an alarm on their 
phone if a rocket is headed their way.81  
 
Given the low lethality of many of the artillery rockets fired into Israel, such civil defense 
measures can be extremely effective.82 The differences in population density between northern 
and southern Israel and an increase in civil defense measures are two variables that Iron Dome’s 
defenders do not control for when they assert that Iron Dome must have worked because 
casualties are lower in the wars that featured Iron Dome and higher in the war that did not. It is 
also suspicious that Rubin and others do not look at casualties from Israel’s Operation Cast Lead, 
yet another operation in Gaza that lasted for 22 days in December 2008 and January 2009, before 
Iron Dome became operational. During Cast Lead, 571 rockets and 205 mortars were fired into 
Israel, killing three people and injuring around 200 others.83 One might expect much higher 
casualties in the absence of Iron Dome instead of casualty figures that are fairly close to what 
was seen in the two operations after Iron Dome’s deployment. Comparisons between Cast Lead 
and Pillar of Defense and Protective Edge would remove population density as a variable, but no 
comparison is made with Cast Lead by Rubin or other Iron Dome defenders.  
 
Differences in population density can also explain the lower numbers of damage claims filed. 
Additionally, because claims can be filed for large damages as well as small, and for damage 
caused by debris from a successful interception and damage caused from a successful strike, 
insurance claims actually explain very little about Iron Dome’s interception rate. The available 
data does not differentiate between small claims caused by debris or large claims caused by a 
rocket impact. Without that information, it is impossible to tell if the number of damage claims is 
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lower for southern Israel because of Iron Dome or because it is more sparsely populated and less 
dense, thus generating fewer claims even for successful rocket strikes.  
 
Even if this information were persuasive in showing Iron Dome worked, it does nothing to 
corroborate the IDF’s specific claims about an 84 percent success rate in 2012 and a 90 percent 
success rate in 2014; it would simply show that Iron Dome is working to some degree. In sum, 
Postol’s arguments raise important questions but his analysis is insufficient to prove Iron Dome 
is failing. At the same time, the arguments advanced by Iron Dome’s defenders fail to refute 
Postol’s technical claims and rely on uncompelling evidence for which alternative explanations 
can be found. Therefore, it is not possible to say definitively which side is correct. The IDF’s 
claims about Iron Dome cannot be proven true, but they also have not been proven false. Without 
additional information, which Israel is currently keeping classified, the true technical efficacy of 
Iron Dome will remain a mystery.    
 
 
Peak Iron Dome? Implications of the Future Threat Environment  
 
Of course, Iron Dome’s actual technical efficacy is important, but in many ways, what Israelis 
believe about Iron Dome is what truly matters. If the system’s skeptics are correct and Iron 
Dome did not actually work (or work as well as advertised), it would make no difference in 
terms of the political benefits to the Israeli government as long as Israelis believe that it worked. 
Belief in Iron Dome’s technical efficacy gives Israelis pride, makes them feel safe and protected, 
and gives the government decision making time and space that it might not otherwise have. 
While Iron Dome’s technical efficacy remains in doubt, there is widespread belief in Israel that it 
performed spectacularly. This faith not only helped Israelis go about their normal lives during 
the fighting, it also gave the IDF space to conduct operations under less political pressure and by 
many accounts saved the Israeli government from having to authorize a massive invasion of 
Gaza. 
 
This has led to extremely high expectations for Iron Dome among the Israeli public, including 
the expectation that all population centers in the country should be protected.84 Such expectations 
may prove to be both militarily and politically dangerous in the future. For while Iron Dome may 
have succeeded technically and certainly succeeded politically during the most recent past two 
wars in Gaza, the less favorable conditions that will likely characterize Israel’s future wars may 
decrease Iron Dome’s technical and political performance. In fact, it is likely that Operation 
Protective Edge saw Iron Dome at its peak technical and political performance—the system’s 
value will either remain about the same during a future war in Gaza, or decrease dramatically 
during a future war with Hezbollah or a multi-front war. This has to do mainly with 
improvements made by Israel’s adversaries to their rocket arsenals, improvements that Iron 
Dome will likely not be able to cope with even if it continues undergoing upgrades.  
 
The Next War with Hezbollah—and Perhaps Others 
Over 34 days in 2006, Hezbollah fired 4,228 rockets, mostly Katyushas, for an average of 124 
rockets a day. Only around a quarter of the rockets fired actually hit built-up areas, meaning an 
average of 31 rockets hit built-up areas each day. This killed 53 people, injured over 2,000, and 
caused massive damage to infrastructure—a huge success for Hezbollah. Doubling down on this 
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tried-and-true strategy, Hezbollah has expanded its rocket arsenal over the last decade and now 
possesses upwards of 100,000 rockets, 10 times more than it had in 2006.85 Some estimates even 
put Hezbollah’s arsenal at 150,000 rockets, larger than the combined arsenals of most European 
states.86  
 
In addition to this massive increase in the size of Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal, there has also been 
an increase in the quality of the rockets Hezbollah has been acquiring, though the degree to 
which this is true is currently unknown. According to media reports and statements from senior 
IDF officials, Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas have been conducting joint research into improving 
the accuracy and lethality of their rockets.87 As Hezbollah and Hamas develop and acquire more 
accurate weapons, they will be able to specifically target critical infrastructure in Israel instead of 
only having the option of firing indiscriminately and hoping they hit critical infrastructure. 
Information about how far along Hezbollah and Hamas are in the process of designing and 
acquiring more accurate rockets is not publically available. It could be that Hezbollah has only 
acquired a handful of larger, more accurate missiles that it might use against key strategic 
targets, while the majority of its Katyusha rockets remain crude. But because Hezbollah knows 
how important improved accuracy will be in its arms race to defeat Iron Dome, Israel must 
assume that it is committing meaningful resources toward this objective.  
 
Iran, now capable of providing greater assistance to Hezbollah with its land corridor to the 
Mediterranean across Iraq and Syria, has also signaled that it is assisting Hezbollah in its quest 
for more advanced weaponry, including rockets with greater accuracy.88 Even if this increase in 
capability is currently limited only to larger missiles that are outside of Iron Dome’s purview 
(and would thus need to be engaged either by Israel’s other BMD and air defense systems), the 
technology necessary to upgrade Katyushas and other crude rockets from statistical weapons to 
weapons with a modicum of accuracy is becoming cheaper and more ubiquitous with each 
passing year. It is possible that Hezbollah has already acquired meaningful numbers of more 
accurate rockets, and if it has not already, it is highly likely that the rate of technological 
progress will enable Hezbollah to do so in the future.     
 
The IDF also believes there is a high likelihood that a future war will involve multiple fronts, 
forcing Israel to confront Hamas in the south and Hezbollah in the north at the same time, with 
perhaps a third front on the border with Syria, a scenario that appears more plausible given the 
Assad regime’s success in Syria’s civil war.89 Such a conflict could see close to 1,500 rockets 
fired at Israel per day, according to IDF officials—the same amount fired at Israel during the 
entirety of Operation Pillar of Defense.90 These rockets could be fired in salvos of 50 or even 100 
rockets.91  
 
Of course, if Israel were able to quickly destroy many of Hezbollah’s rockets and launchers on 
the ground at the beginning of a war, the smaller number of surviving rockets might be a 
manageable threat for Iron Dome. Israel has made dramatic increases in its aerial strike 
capability, claiming the ability to strike in 24 hours the number of targets it struck in Lebanon 
during the entire 34 day war in 2006.92 But it is not a guarantee that Israel’s increased 
capabilities to target Hezbollah’s rockets will be enough to overcome the sheer size of 
Hezbollah’s arsenal, coupled with its sophisticated deployment strategy. Hezbollah’s rocket 
arsenal and launchers are dispersed, well-hidden in hardened and urban areas, and mobile. If 
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history is any guide, targeting rockets and launchers on the ground, even in a massive aerial and 
artillery campaign, will not be effective at reducing Hezbollah’s capacity to sustain large rates of 
fire against Israel. Israel’s air force and artillery corps were unable to stop Hezbollah from 
continuously firing rockets when its arsenal size was only 13,000. Hezbollah’s much larger 
arsenal, deployed in an even more sophisticated manner, will likely be able to survive Israeli 
attrition for the duration of the fighting and sustain a large enough rate of fire against Israel to 
overwhelm Iron Dome and reduce its utility sufficiently to cause political and military costs to 
Israel. At the very least, Israel must recognize this as a realistic possibility.    
 
These developments present two huge new hurdles for Iron Dome. First, the sheer quantity of 
rockets, especially if they are fired in such massive salvos, may be so large that Iron Dome’s 
radar will become overwhelmed. The radar works by scanning for rockets and, once it finds one, 
dwelling on it for a certain amount of time before moving on to scan for other rockets. It then 
returns to the first rocket again in order to track its trajectory, and repeats this process for all the 
rockets it finds. As the radar is forced to dwell on more rockets in this cycle, it has less time to 
scan for new objects and has to wait longer before returning to each rocket, which lessens the 
quality of the trajectory calculation.  
 
Because the IDF is aware that Hezbollah will attempt salvos of perhaps 100 rockets at a time, 
they are surely doing everything they can to equip Iron Dome’s radar for such a scenario. But all 
radars have their limits, and given the size of Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal, it may be a battle that 
Iron Dome’s radar cannot win. The volume of indiscriminant rocket fire likely to be witnessed in 
a future war might also force the Iron Dome batteries to expend their magazines of interceptors 
extremely quickly, either causing the IDF to run out of interceptors or forcing soldiers to 
constantly reload the launchers, during which time those launchers will be unusable. After firing 
a huge volley of rockets that depletes Iron Dome’s magazines, an adversary could fire a second 
volley that will face no attrition from Iron Dome.   
 
Second, if a portion of Hezbollah and Hamas’s arsenals include guided projectiles, as reports 
indicate, the percentage of total rockets that Iron Dome will have to intercept will increase. 
Assume the 1,500 rockets per day estimate for a future war is correct. If all of these rockets are 
unguided, as they were in all previous engagements, about a fourth of them, 375, would be 
expected to hit populated areas. If a certain percentage of those projectiles are guided, that 
number will increase because the guided projectiles have a better than one-fourth chance of 
landing in a protected area.  
 
Additionally, a guided rocket may require Iron Dome to fire more than one Tamir in order to 
successfully intercept it. This is because the course corrections of the guided rocket will 
complicate the radars’ tracking and provide less time to calculate an intercept point.93 Any 
terminal guidance on the projectile can also interfere with the Tamir’s ability to detonate in close 
enough proximity to the incoming warhead in order to destroy it.94 Equipping short-range rockets 
with cheap GPS guidance systems is relatively easy. It would increase the cost of each rocket 
substantially but would still be far cheaper than each Tamir interceptor. Hamas and Hezbollah 
would not need to equip all of their rockets with such guidance systems in order to change the 
equation with Israel dramatically. If only a small percentage of their rocket arsenals contain 
guided rockets, it is not difficult to imagine various tactics wherein they mix and match both 
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types of rockets in order to defeat Iron Dome. They might fire huge volleys of unguided rockets 
to deplete Iron Dome’s magazines and then fire guided rockets at critical targets that would be 
temporarily defenseless. They might also fire a salvo comprised mostly of unguided rockets with 
only a few guided rockets mixed in, increasing the chances that the guided rockets get through. 
Such tactics can become even more complex if medium-range missiles and cruise missiles are 
added to the mix. 
 
Potential Consequences of Iron Dome’s Degraded Performance  
The massive increase in the quantity of the rockets pointed at Israel, coupled with the increase in 
the quality of some of those rockets, calls into question the viability of Iron Dome in large-scale 
conflicts. If Iron Dome is called upon to perform in combat under less favorable conditions than 
existed in 2012 and 2014, and it fails to deliver results in accordance with the Israeli population’s 
expectations, what might the consequences be? Despite some IDF officials attempting to lower 
expectations about Iron Dome,95 Israelis now expect the population to be protected, often to an 
unrealistic degree. This presents three main problems. First, complacency about the rocket 
threat—under the belief that Iron Dome works exceptionally well and will continue to do so in 
future wars—can cause reckless behavior, including ignoring the sirens alerting people to seek 
shelter. This has already happened, as some Israelis remained outside during rocket attacks in 
attempts to take pictures of Iron Dome in action. The benefit of feeling protected, which allows 
for some degree of normalcy during wartime, is a good thing, but if taken too far it can degrade 
the civil defense necessary to save lives. 
 
Second, if the combination of larger raid sizes and guided rockets is used to target IDF bases, the 
government may decide to prioritize protecting those bases at the expense of the population. The 
IDF relies heavily on its air force, and ensuring that fighter jets can take off and land without 
interruption will be critical for any future war effort. Because Iron Dome batteries are a limited 
resource, decisions must be made about how to allocate that resource when the demand is greater 
than the supply. If there simply aren’t enough Iron Dome batteries to provide protection to 
military and critical infrastructure while also protecting population centers, the IDF will be 
forced to pull coverage from population centers. This is likely to have political ramifications. If 
the level of damage that befalls the population centers after coverage was withdrawn is severe, 
anger at the government could cause inquiries or even the shattering of the ruling coalition as 
parties blame each other for electoral gain. It is extremely difficult for any government to take 
away benefits that the population has already received.  
 
Lastly, what effect might Iron Dome’s degraded performance have on the perception of victory 
in both Israel and the Arab world? Iron Dome helped Israelis conceptualize the outcome of the 
last two wars as victories for Israel because Hamas’s main threat had been neutralized. Because 
Israelis place so much pride and faith in Iron Dome, if the system performs below expectations 
(or is exposed as not working as well as previously believed), Israelis might have a harder time 
believing they achieved victory during a future war. Hamas and Hezbollah certainly understand 
the role that Iron Dome has played in the Israeli narrative of its wars and would be quick to 
exploit Iron Dome’s perceived or real weaknesses for propaganda purposes and to claim to its 
own people that it achieved victory. Parades in Beirut and Gaza City trumpeting the success of 
the crude rocket over Israel’s sophisticated defense system are not hard to imagine, even if Iron 
Dome achieves, say, a 60 percent success rate instead of a 90 percent success rate. Because 
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Israelis expect better, anything substantially less than 90 percent will be embarrassing. For 
Hamas and Hezbollah, any degradation of Iron Dome’s success rate could be claimed as a 
victory attributable to their perseverance and successful rocket-launching tactics.  
 
 
Conclusion: Iron Dome’s Role in Israel’s Defense Strategy  
 
Because crude rockets will always be cheaper and more plentiful than the sophisticated 
interceptors needed to counter them, rocket defense will be an arms race that the defender is 
eventually going to lose. To be sure, while Hamas and Hezbollah have been busy growing their 
arsenals and devising tactics to defeat Iron Dome, the Israelis have been working to keep up. 
Israeli officials often tout the upgrades that Iron Dome has received over the years. The Israeli 
Air Force’s Aerial Defense Division commander claimed in 2016 that, “other than the name, 
everything [about Iron Dome] is completely different.”96   
 
Israel has also signaled recently that it wishes to expedite production of additional Iron Dome 
batteries to meet the evolving threat.97 These upgrades may help keep pace with Hamas’s arsenal 
given that Hamas is smaller and less capable than Hezbollah. Israel and Egypt also maintain a 
blockade of the Gaza Strip to prevent Hamas from smuggling additional rockets into the 
territory. But against 150,000 rockets in the hands of a wealthier and more capable enemy like 
Hezbollah, which faces no blockade from Israel, upgrades to Iron Dome are unlikely to keep up. 
Therefore, it is possible that Israel has reached “peak Iron Dome,” wherein the system’s 
performance may increase or decrease slightly in future engagements with Hamas, but will 
almost certainly perform poorly in a future conflict with Hezbollah or a multifront war, which 
IDF officials believe is a likely scenario.  
 
This is not to say that Iron Dome was not worth the cost and should not have been invented. It 
worked well, either technically, politically, or both, under the unique set of conditions seen over 
the past decade. But expectations about Iron Dome must be brought in line with reality. Having 
an unrealistic expectation of protection from rockets during future wars could prove deadly for 
civilians and costly to Israel politically. The Israeli government must begin the process of 
explaining to the population the conditions of a future war that will make protection of the entire 
country impossible. Either the IDF will need the batteries for the war effort or the system will 
simply be overwhelmed by the larger raid sizes fired into Israel. If Israelis understand that Iron 
Dome will not provide such coverage, they will take the civil defense measures more seriously 
and will be less likely to see any of Iron Dome’s failures as a failure of the war effort overall.  
 
Israel should keep Iron Dome and continue to upgrade it, mostly for use in conflicts with Gaza 
and to intercept the handful of rockets that militants occasionally fire into Israel during 
peacetime—essentially taking these “cheap shots” off the table as an effective terror weapon. It 
may also have a role in defending Israeli offshore oil drilling platforms.98 But it should not be 
expected to defend Israel if and when the next war with Hezbollah or a regional war comes. Its 
role must be understood as limited by both the people and the government.  
 
If Israel goes into the next war with its current mindset about Iron Dome, the disparity between 
Israel’s expectations and reality may result in a perception of failure after the fighting stops. 
 
Future Challenges for Israel’s Iron Dome Rocket Defenses     22 
Hezbollah, Hamas, and others will claim that its rockets overcame Israel’s miracle weapon. They 
may even benefit from an Israeli ground invasion necessitated by Iron Dome’s degraded 
performance, which would force Israeli soldiers into densely populated and booby-trapped 
territory where Hamas and Hezbollah fighters can confront them more easily. If large quantities 
of rockets strike Israeli population centers, Israel may feel compelled to use even heavier 
military force, creating a diplomatic crisis for Israel and a humanitarian crisis for the residents of 
Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria.    
 
Hopefully, these theoretical questions about Iron Dome’s performance in a future war will never 
be answered and deterrence between Israel and its adversaries will hold for the foreseeable 
future.99 The tragic consequences of deterrence failure for the innocent on all sides are painful to 
imagine. But in an unstable region, the possibility of another war between Israel and its 
adversaries is a real, and growing, possibility. Israel, and Iron Dome’s advocates around the 
world, would be wise to temper their expectations about the system’s performance given the very 
real chance that the next war produces conditions so unfavorable for rocket defense that Iron 
Dome becomes viewed as a failure.       
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